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Summary— Intruders which log-in through a series of machines when conducting an attack are 
hard to trace because of the complex architecture of the Internet. The thumbprinting method provides 
an efficient way of tracing such intruders by determining whether two connections are part of the 
same connection chain. Since many connections are transient, and therefore short in length, choosing 
the best time interval to thumbprint over can be an issue. In this paper, we provide a way to shorten 
the time interval used for thumbprinting. We then study some special properties of the thumbprinting 
function. 
We also study another mechanism for tracing intruders in the Internet based on a timestamping 
approach which passively monitors flows between source and destination pairs. Given a potentially 
suspicious source, we identify its true destination. We compute the error probability of our algorithm 
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and show that its value decreases exponentially as the observation time increases. Our simulation 
results show that our approach performs well. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Constant change is perhaps a guiding principle the Internet. Recent advances in technology have lead to 
significant growth of the Internet by factors of 10
3
 and 10
6
 in backbone speed and the number of hosts, 
respectively [7]. Since the public expansion of the Internet in 1990, many new challenges have surfaced; 
among them, operations between un-trusted end-points, more demanding applications, and less sophisticated 
users have caused severe stress on Internet requirements. Furthermore, the number of attacks on networked 
computer systems has been growing exponentially from year to year. When considering the task of tracing 
intruders in the Internet, three main challenges must be taken into account. First, attackers hide their origin by 
making use of the Internet’s architecture. By using different hosts which belong to different countries and 
administrative domains to route malicious acts, intruders’ actions become extremely difficult to trace. 
Second, the data collected from an Internet trace is usually incomplete or has missing values. For example, 
different domains of Internet service providers (ISPs) may not share data due to access issues, such as when 
they are in different counties. Finally, routes change frequently, packets are lost, and the network latency and 
time to convergence can be significantly increased due to routing instability. 
To deal with such problems, two tracing mechanisms exist [4]: (1) methods of keeping track of all 
individuals and accounting for all activities, and (2) reactive tracing, in which no global accounting is 
attempted until a problem arises. In our view, the first mechanism is most related to network accountability 
and the second mechanism is most related to network forensics. Network-based tracing and host-based 
tracing are two common approaches for reactive tracing in connection chains. Host-based tracing involves 
one tracing system per network host [4], and a chain of connection hosts can be known via (1) host 
communications [3] or (2) reversing the attack chain by breaking the hosts in reverse order [5]. Host-based 
tracing schemes suffer when an extended connection crosses a host not running the system [4]. 
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Network-based tracing has the advantage of not relying on hosts which can be untrusty or requiring host 
participation. Instead, network-based tracing uses the invariance of connections at higher protocol layers 
(such as the transport layer) to establish whether two connections are part of the same connection chain. We 
study two approaches for network-based tracing. The first approach is based on the idea of a connection 
thumbprint. A thumbprint is very similar to a checksum or the computed summary of the content of a 
connection [4], [2]. The thumbprint summarizes the content of a connection using only a small amount of 
data while simultaneously preserving the uniqueness of the connection. Therefore, thumbprints of related 
connections are similar and can lead to the construction of a connection chain. However, the thumbprinting 
method is dependent on the duration of the connection; so the time period used for thumbprinting is very 
important especially in the case of transient flows. In this paper, we provide a way to shorten the time interval 
required for thumbprinting. We study the tradeoff introduced by using a smaller time interval and its effect on 
basic thumbprint properties such as sensitivity and robustness.  
Since thumbprinting relies on the content of the packages and therefore can be counterattacked by 
encryption, we study a second mechanism for tracing Internet intruders which involves passively monitoring 
flows between source and destination pairs in the Internet, a process similar to [1]. This approach is based on 
monitoring the transmission activities of nodes and does not interfere with network operations. A one-hop 
communication graph can be constructed by matching transmission timestamps and acknowledgements. 
Based on this graph, the nodes that are part of a connection chain are those which communicate at a 
sufficiently high rate. Our approach is different from the approach in [1] in that we make fewer statistical 
assumptions and we use clearer, simpler derivations. In addition, because we are working with the Internet, 
we face other challenges, like the availability of only partial information and the route instability mentioned 
above. To account for this, we assume that the information on every link has a certain probability of 
availability. 
Our motivations in this paper can be derived from the above discussions as follows:  
1. to find a way to improve current thumbprinting method for transient traffic flows by shortening the time 
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interval required for thumbprinting; 
2. to study the tradeoff introduced by using a smaller time interval and its effect on basic thumbprint 
properties such as sensitivity and robustness. 
According to these motivations, relevant contributions are made as follows: 
1. To found out the equation for sampling traffic in any time interval and the properties that can be used 
for identifying related flows so that we can shorten the time interval required for thumbprinting; 
2. To obtain the error probability of our algorithm and show that its value decreases exponentially as the 
observation time increases. 
3. to consider network background noise and redesigned a passive tracing scheme accordingly. 
4. to provide numerical results and simulation results. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents significant work related to our 
problem; Section 3 presents our results concerning minimizing the thumbprinting interval; Section 4 contains 
a detailed introduction to the tracing algorithm followed by an evaluation of its consistency in terms of error 
probability; Section 5 presents some graphical interpretations of the derivations; Section 6 provides 
simulations; Section 7 is the paper’s conclusion. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Paper [4] presents an IP traceback method based on the thumbprint idea. Often, attacks are conducted by 
logging through a chain of host machines. In this way, intruders make use of the Internet architecture to hide 
their true origin. The thumbprint technology, which is the summary of a connection, is used to compare 
connections and therefore trace the source of such an attack. A thumbprint is computed for each time interval, 
typically a minute, of each connection [4]. Thumbprinting has the advantage of preserving the characteristics 
of a connection while being cheap to compute and requiring little storage. Similar methods like checksum and 
message digest have two main disadvantages. Firstly, an error in the content leads to a different value being 
computed, and thus these methods are not robust. Secondly, they are not additive (i.e., two successive values 
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cannot be combined to provide a new value for a longer interval). Other compression schemes require far 
more storage space than thumbprinting. 
As the thumbprinting method is dependent on the duration of the connection, it is of importance to shorten 
the time interval used for thumbprinting, especially in the case of transient flows. This is the purpose of our 
derivation in Section 3. 
However, fingerprinting techniques are vulnerable and may not be of interest when the attacker uses 
encryption at every hop in the chain. To deal with such problems, techniques based on packet timing 
information are more suitable. 
Paper [1] presents a mechanism for tracing intruders in anonymous MANETs by passively monitoring 
flows between source and destination pairs. The algorithm is concerned with tracing the destination of a 
certain source which is considered to be suspicious according to a higher layer intrusion detection protocol. 
Because anonymity of nodes in the MANET is assumed and the monitoring is done in a non-intrusive way, 
this research only considers the timestamps of packets on adjacent links, and uses these to establish causal 
relationships between packets. A graph is used to model the communications among nodes. Based on traffic 
analysis and information carried in the packets, the graph is partitioned into two parts, one containing the set 
of possible destinations, and one with which the source does not communicate. The following assumptions 
are made about the distribution of traffic: the transmission activities on each link are assumed to follow a 
Poisson process, the rate of the flow to be traced is sufficiently high, and the duration of the observation is 
long enough. Therefore, the method will not work for low-rate or transient flows. 
Much like [1], we focus on tracing flows between pairs (source, destination), but we do so with the Internet. 
Unlike [1], we assume differences in data due to propagation delays, clocks being skewed during observation 
at multiple nodes at the same time, and the data which is either missing from observations or observed 
erroneously. We account for this by setting a probability at which information is available on every link. We 
also make fewer assumptions about the rate of the Poisson process, and the calculations are significantly 
simplified. Some other related work includes [12-46]. 
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3. THUMPRINTING 
The thumbprinting approach is based on the fact that, at higher protocol layers, the content of a connection 
is invariant at all points of the chain. The thumbprint summarizes the content of the connection using only a 
small amount of data while preserving the uniqueness of the connection. We first define the terminology and 
then present a method for shortening the time interval required for thumbprinting and some interesting 
properties of the thumbprint function. 
3.1 Original Algorithm 
A thumbprint is a function of a connection which preserves the unique characteristics of the connection. 
We use the notations and definition of a thumbprint from [4]. Consider a sequence of transmitted characters 
Laaa ,,, 21 …  which needs to be thumbprinted. Consider also the function KR→A:α , which takes a character 
and returns a vector of K  real numbers. Let ( )•kα  denote the k-th component of the function. Here K  is a 
short fixed number representing the number of thumbprint components. If we consider L  as the period of a 
connection, we can associate frequencies ( )Lffff ,...,, 21=  to our character sequence. Then the thumbprint is 
defined as [4]: 
             ( ) { }KkfaT L
i
iikk ,...,2,1,
1
∈=∑= α .           (1) 
The thumbprint is thus a linear combination of the frequencies of characters and their corresponding 
weights. kT  represents the k th component of the K -dimensional thumbprint vector. 
Each thumbprint component, ( )tCTk , , is a function of a specific connection C and the time interval t , in 
which the thumbprints have been computed. From [4], we also know that the comparison of two sets of 
thumbprints, ( )tCTk ,  and ( )tCTk ,' , { }Kk ,...,2,1∈ , for two different connections C  and 'C , is given by the 
following formula: 
          ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −= ∏=Kk kkt tCTtCTCC 1 ,,'log',δ          (2) 
t
δ  represents the logarithm of the product of component differences for two thumbprints in a specific time 
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interval t . A large absolute value of
t
δ  implies that the two connections are related, while a small absolute 
value suggests that they are independent. 
3.2 Minimizing The Thumbprinting Interval 
In this section, based on the results in section 3.1 [4], we try to find the best period of time T , over which to 
thumbprint. The length of time divisions for the experiments in [4] is 1  time unit. However, many 
connections in the Internet are transient and therefore short in length; in these cases a shortened 
thumbprinting interval is needed. Hence, we need to find a new equation, rather than (1), to better describe the 
characteristic of each link or session in terms of more precise time duration. 
We start with the thumbprint function given by (1), and we then account for the time in which the 
thumbprint has been computed. This gives us the following function: 
( ) ( )tafta
ta
k ,,
,
∑α .    (3) 
We will use the function given by (3) above as our thumbprinting function.  
We now show the results of changes to variables Lya =  and τTt = . This transforms our time interval from 
[ ]T,0  to [ ]1,0  and the samples from every time unit to every T1  time units.  Thus the thumbprinting function 
in (3) can be approximated by the following integral: 
( ) ( )[ ] [ ]∫∫× TL k dadttataf,0,0 ,, α .    (4) 
 
We have: 
( ) ( )[ ] [ ] ≈∫∫× TL k dadttataf,0,0 ,, α ( ) ( ) ( )LTtaftaLT ta k ,,,∑α  
( ) ( ) ( )LTTLyfTLyLT
y
k
Tt
Lya τταττ ,,,∑===  
( ) ( )[ ] [ ]∫∫×= 1,01,0 ,, ττατ dydTLyTLyfLT k  
The time period has become interval [ ]1,0 . 
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Since thumbprinting over a one unit time interval may not provide the best results, we further provide a way 
to transform interval [ ]1,0  into an arbitrary time interval [ ]qp, . In the following calculus, we use 
( ) ( )mnmuy −−=  and ( ) ( )pqpv −−=τ . We have: 
( ) ( )[ ] [ ]∫∫× 1,01,0 ,, ττατ dydTLyTLyfLT k  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) dudvvuypqpvTmnmuL
pqpvTmnmuLfLT
k
qpnm
,
,
,
,
,,
∂∂−−−−
⋅−−−−= ∫∫× τα  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )[ ] [ ] ⋅−− −−−−= ∫∫× qpnm pqmn pqpvTmnmuLfLT ,, ,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) dudvpqmn pqpvTmnmuLk −− −−−− ,α .   (5) 
In equation (5), the time period has become interval [ ]qp, . This interval can be suitably chosen to 
accommodate connections with low/high data rates and transient connections in order to give the best 
performance possible under different scenarios. 
 
3.3 Properties of the Thumbprinting Function 
In the following, we describe a way to easily compute the value of the integral given by (4) by using the mean 
value theorem [10]. We further study some special properties of the thumbprinting function.  
 Consider the right-hand side of equation (5). 
Let us choose 0u  and 0v to be the points toward which we concentrate intervals [ ]nm,  and [ ]qp, , 
respectively. By making 0, unm →  and 0, vqp →  (i.e. 0→− mn  and 0→− pq ), we have: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫∫∫∫ ×× = ]1,0[]1,0[],0[],0[ ,,,, ττατα dydTLyTLyfLTdadttataf kTL k  ( )( )pqmn dudvpq
pv
T
mn
mu
L
pq
pv
T
mn
mu
LfLT k
qpnm −−
⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −−−−⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −−−−= ∫∫× ,,],[],[ α  
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⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −−−−⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −−−−= pq pvTmn muLpq pvTmn muLLTf k 0000 ,, α  
., 00 ⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −−−−= pq pvTmn muLhLT        (6) 
We have considered kfh α=  where h  is a continuous function. Let ( ) ( )∫∫×= ]1,0[]1,0[ ,, ττατ dydTLyTLyfLTI k . If h  is 
a nC  function where 1≥n , then the set of points ( ) ( )( ){ }0000 ,;, vufLTIvu kαγ ==  represents a nC  curve which, 
according to the Implicit Function Theorem [6], ensures the existence of a function φ  such 
that Juuv ∈= 000 ),(φ , where J  is an interval included in [ ]nm, . This way we can express one of the variables 
0u  and 0v as a function of the other. 
The last equality in (6) is true for any ( ) [ ] [ ]qpnmvu ,,, 00 ×∈  on the curve γ . 
We have thus shown that the value of the integral in (4) can be found by computing the value of the function 
kfα  at any point belonging to curve γ . 
Furthermore, if we choose: 
,)()(
,,10,,
0
0 δλφ δεε tpu pqttmumn += +=<<+=+=  
we have: 
( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛= δ δλεεα )(, tTtLfLTI k  ( )( ) ( )( ) .,,, JttTLttTLtLTf k ∈= λαλ  
We have shown that on the curve ( )( ){ }Juuu ∈= 000 ;,φγ  we have: 
( )( ) ( )( ) .,, 0000 constuuLTf Iuuk == φφα . In order to determine the constant, we simply need to compute I . 
Therefore, kα  and f are inversely proportional on curve γ . 
We now introduce an abstraction of the derivations used above by using a mean value operator. The use of 
this operator generalizes the procedure of associating the function h with its mean value. Such an operator can 
be defined as follows: 
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( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ]( )bChxhT
x
dtth
hhT
x
x
x
,0,limlim00
0
0
0
∈=== ↓↓ ∫ , for one variable and 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,0,lim,0 0 22],0[],0[ 2121
0
≠== ∫∫∫×↓ y
y
dtth
xy
dtdttth
yhT
y
yx
x
, 
( )( ) ( )
x
dtth
xhT
x∫= 0 11 0,0, , 
( )( ) ( )0,00,0 hhT = , for two variables. 
Operator T  associates function h  with another function that is equal at every point x to the mean value of 
function h  on interval [ ]x,0 . In Section 5, we will see the computation has been simplified by using this mean 
value approach.  
4. TRACING THE TRUE DESTINATION OF A SOURCE 
Since many attackers use encryption at every hop in the chain, the same packet will have different content on 
every link and fingerprinting techniques are not appropriate in this case. Therefore, we present a mechanism 
from paper [1] for tracing intruders in anonymous MANETs which based on using transmission timestamps 
to passively monitor the flows between source and destination pairs. Such an approach can be implemented 
by using sensors equipped with energy detectors to measure transmission timestamps and then distributing 
them over the field of interest. All measurements are fused and processed by a centralized monitor at a fusion 
center. 
 We first introduce the algorithm and its main features and then analyze the algorithm in terms of the error 
probability of detecting the true destination of a source. We show that the error probability decays 
exponentially with the observation time and also prove a similar result when the number of observed graphs 
goes to infinity. 
4.1 Original Algorithm 
Our derivation is based on a variation of the tracing algorithm from [1]. In [1], the approach for tracing the 
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destination of a source is two fold. First, based on the transmission activities on adjacent links, it can be 
determined whether these links are part of the same flow. Then, a set of possible destinations is computed. 
Second, the intersection method is used: using the changes in topology, some nodes are eliminated, leading to 
a smaller set of possible destinations. 
It is assumed that the transmission activities on each link follow a Poisson process S , and its realization is 
denoted by s . Therefore a realization of the transmission timestamps of data packets on link 1  will be 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 11 , 2 , 3 ,s s s= …s . Here uppercase letters denote random variables, lowercase letters realizations, 
boldface letters vectors, and plain letters scalars. 
In the following, we briefly introduce the idea behind the traffic analysis method and the intersection of 
different topologies method from [1]. 
For traffic analysis, consider two realizations ( )21 , ss  of the transmission activities (timestamps) on two 
adjacent links. Let m  and n  be the indices of the current timestamps on links 1 and 2, respectively 
( 21 0,0 δδ ≤≤≤≤ nm ). These sets of timestamps are matched against each other sequentially by assessing the 
difference ( ) ( )msns 12 − . If ( ) ( ) Δ≤− msns 12 , where Δ is a predefined maximum delay, and this difference is 
nonnegative, then the two timestamps match. The matching timestamps from the two connections form a pair 
of sequences ( )21 , ff . Given the number of matching timestamps on a link, the empirical rate on that link can 
be now estimated. Specifically, if if  contains iF  timestamps over time T , then the empirical rate is TFi . 
 Let 0≥τ  be a given rate. Given a graph sourced at j , by repeatedly applying the matching timestamps 
algorithm for pairs of adjacent links, and selecting only the flows which support rates of at least τ , a subgraph 
of the initial graph can be obtained. This new graph will contain only nodes which node j  can talk to at a rate 
higher or equal toτ . The method, called Trace Destination (TD), is applied for the graph sourced at O , and a 
set of possible destinations is obtained. However, node O can only be a relay node for some of these flows. In 
order to trace down the flows that are going through O , but did not originate at O , TD is applied for all 
immediate predecessors of O  and the corresponding graphs sourced at these nodes. The set of obtained 
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destinations is then subtracted from the previously obtained set of destinations of O . 
To speed up the algorithm’s convergence, a changing topology feature is used. Basically, the algorithm TD 
is applied for every communication graph that is observed. For each observed graph, a set of destinations if 
obtained. The final set of possible destinations is the intersection over all sets from all observed graphs. Out 
of this final set, the node which appears most frequently in all topologies is selected. If there are multiple 
possible destinations with the same number of appearances across all different topologies, then one node is 
selected at random. 
4.2 Analysis 
Our tracing algorithm is a variation of the one from Section 4.1, in which we account for the lack of 
information in the observations. We model the lack of information by considering that the information on 
each link is available with a certain probability. We denote this probability by { }Kkpk ,...,2,1, ∈ , where K  is the 
number of links in the considered path. In this modified algorithm, only flows which support rates of at least 
τ≥kk pr  are selected from the initial graph. 
It is now useful to study how well our variation of the algorithm from Section 4.1 converges. We thus study 
the probability eP  with which the algorithm finds the destination erroneously (called error probability) and 
analyze its asymptotic behavior over time T . We would like to mention that even though we assume Poisson 
distribution of packets on a link for our specific derivation, the algorithm and analysis here can be applied to 
different types of traffic. 
Our error probability derivation is also inspired from [1]. Assume that the transmission activities on each 
link follow a Poisson process of rate 1<R . It is well-known that the Poisson distribution of the number of 
events in a time interval ( ]ttt ′+,  is given by the following relation: 
( )[ ] ( ) ,...,1,0,
!
=′==− ′−′+ n
n
tRe
nmmP
ntR
ttt  
where ttt mm −′+  represents the number of events in time interval ( ]ttt ′+,  (see for example [11]). 
Let O  be the source whose destination we are trying to find and let θ  be the true destination of O . We 
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denote the destination rendered by our algorithm with θˆ . We then derive the probability that θˆ  is not the true 
destination of O . Let kn  be the number of timestamps taken in time interval ( )1, +kk mm , corresponding to link ( )1, +kk . We denote the total number of timestamps taken for one flow by 1N . 
By definition, 
 
( ) ( )( ).TD algorithmby  detectedcorrectly not  is ˆ: θ θθP PTDPP ee= ≠==  
According to [1], Theorem 4.4, the fact that the algorithm does not find the true destination is due to one of 
three possibilities: 
A) θ  is not detected because the empirical rate along the path from O  to θ  is less than τ ; we will denote 
the probability of this event by ( )AP ; 
B) θ  is mistaken for a relay node because there is some node j  which is a successor of θ , for which the 
empirical rate from O  to j  is greater than τ . We denote the probability of this event by ( )BP ; 
C) θ  is incorrectly detected as being the destination of a flow originating in some predecessor of O . We 
denote the probability of this event by ( )CP ; 
In cases B and C, all the empirical probabilities are greater than or equal to τ . So 
( ) ( ) ( )CPBPAPPe ++≤ .       (7) 
In the following, we establish an upper bound for ( )BP . The empirical rate on the path from O  to j  is given 
by ( ) TTN1 .  
( ) ( )TTTNKeBP 1−≤ , 
where K is a constant related to ( )Gcard . 
( ) τkk pr
T
TN ≥≥1  for all k  ( ) pp
T
TN
k
~
links of #
1 ττ =≥=> ∑ . 
Using the fact that 
( )
p
T
TN ~1 τ−≤− , we obtain: 
 14( ) ( ) pTTN KeKeBP ~1 τ−− ≤≤ . 
Similarly, for ( )CP we have: ( ) pTKeCP ˆτ−≤ . 
For ( )AP , the assumption is that there is at least one link along the path from O  to θ with an empirical rate 
which is less than τ . Suppose 0j  is the first node on the path connected to a link whose rate is less than τ . 
Therefore all links along the path up to 0j  have rates greater than or equal to τ . Let 1N  be the total number of 
timestamps taken during the observation period T . 
We denote by λ  the rate of the Poisson process defined by the recorded timestamps. Then the rate on an 
arbitrary interval [ ]1, +kk mm  is ( )kk mm −+1λ . 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) .! 0 10 110 1 ∏∏ + ′+′′+ ∈′ −−−= −−+ −≤ jNk mmrjk mmrk nkkk kkkkkkk een mmrAP  
( )0jN +  denotes all successors of node 0j  on links with rates of at least R . Notice that in the first product 
τkk pr ≥  for all k , while all kr ′  from the second product are less than τkp . On the other hand, 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )001 jmTjNTNrk −−≥′ . We thus have: 
( )
)),(exp(),(
))(exp(),())(exp(
)]((exp[)(exp()]((
)(
)()(
exp[)]((exp[
01
1011
1
1
0
00
0
01
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
TTjK
TNjKTN
mmpjNCjmT
jmT
jNTN
mmpCAP
kk
j
k
kj
kk
j
k
kj
ρτ τ
τ
τ
−= −=−
−−=−
− −−−−≤
+
−
=
+
−
= ∑∑  
where 
( ) ( )∏−= + −= 10 10 0 !jk k nkkk n mmrjC k  and 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0000 , jmjNejCjK ττ −=′ . 
Here we let ( ) 0lim 1 >= ∞→ TTNTρ . 
Therefore ( )AP  decreases exponentially with the observation time. 
Using equation (7), we now have: 
 15( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )( ).2, GcardGcard, 0ˆ,~min ˆ~0 KjKe eeejKP ppT pTpTTe +′= ++′≤− −−− τττ ττρ  
We can now investigate the convergence rate of our algorithm by showing the asymptotic decay rate of the 
error probability as time increases. 
By logarithming the above inequality we obtain: 
( ) ( ) 0ˆ,~minlnlim >≥−∞→ ppTPeT τ . 
Compared to the upper bound for the error of algorithm TD, which is τ  (corresponding to the case 1=kp  
for all k ), the modified algorithm has upper bound ( )pp ˆ,~minτ . 
The minimum is strictly positive as the minimum of a finite number of strictly positive values. 
We can see that the algorithm has an exponential convergence rate on error probability over time T. That 
means, in our work, the error rate of finding correct connection pairs will decrease exponentially while the 
observing time goes up.   
4.3 Generalization 
We now prove a generalization of the previous result regarding the error probability when the number M  
of observable graphs goes to infinity. 
If in the mobile case θθ ˆ≠  for all M cases, then in each observable graph iG , Mi ,1= , we have θθ ˆ≠ . If we 
consider these M events independently, we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ,2,card2 2,card2, 02 2lnln02lnln2 MTTM MTTTTMe ejKTGe ejKeGeMTP ρτ ττ −− ++−+− += +≤  
where ( ) 0, >TNρ . 
 
If we consider T  to be fixed and sufficiently large, and the number M  of graphs going to infinity, the error 
probability again decays exponentially. We have: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( ).card2, card, ˆ,~,min0 ˆ,~,min ppMTM MppTe eGjK eGMTP ρτττρτ −−+′= ≤  
So eP  decreases with the speed of 
TMe τ− . We then have: 
 16( )( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ] .02,lnˆ,~min card2,lnˆ,~minlim
,lnlim
0
0 >+′+= +′+
≥−
∞→
∞→
KjKppT
MGjKMppTM
MMTP
M
e
M
ττ ττ  
We have obtained a bound on eP  which is strictly smaller than 1 and thus non-trivial. It means given a 
sufficient observation time, no matter how many the observation objects are, our tracing scheme still can get 
the correct connection pairs in a low error rate. In another words, it is scalable. 
5. NUMERICAL EVALUATION 
Given two connections C and C’, Fig. 1 represents the frequency of occurrences of the same character ia  at 
every minute in the two connections over a period of time L . f denotes the frequency of ia  in connection C 
and g  represents the frequency of the same character in C’. The area between the graphs of f  and g  
approximates the sum of the differences between the frequencies of characters in the two connections from 
Section 3: B: ( ) ( )( ) ( )∑= −Li iii Lapagaf1 . 
 
Fig. 1 Maximum difference between f  and g  in absolute value. 
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Fig. 2 represents the volume as given by the integral ( ) ( )[ ] [ ]∫∫× TL k dadttataf,0,0 ,, α . The volume of the solid in Fig. 2 
is bounded above by ( ) ( )tataf k ,, α  and below by [ ] [ ]TL ,0,0 ×  in the xy plane. 
 
Fig. 2 Volume of the solid that lies below function ( ) ( )tataf k ,, α  on [ ] [ ]TL ,0,0 × . 
The volume of the solid in Fig. 3 is bounded above by ( ) ( )τατ TLyTLyf k ,,  and below by [ ] [ ]1,01,0 ×  in the 
xy plane. 
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Fig. 3 Volume of the solid that lies below function 
In Fig. 3, the observation time L  used for comparing two connections has been shrunk by a factor m . 
However, the number of samples (measured frequencies) taken is the same. Instead of measuring the 
frequency of a character every minute, we measure every m/1 minutes. The emphasized region determined by 
the graphs of f and g in Fig. 3 has the same volume as the region in Fig. 2. We can see how after the change of 
variable the height of the figure increase as its base decreases, while the volume remains constant (Figs. 2 and 
3). 
 
Fig. 4 Approximating the volume defined by the double integral. The volume of  ( ),
S
f x y dxdy∫∫  is equal to the 
volume of the rectangular parallelepiped drawn in red. 
An interesting consequence of the mean theorem ([10]) is shown in Fig. 4. There exists a point ( ) Syx ∈00 ,  
for which the volume of the integral ( )∫∫
S
dxdyyxf ,  is equal to ( ) ( )Syxf Area, 00 .  
( )00 , yxf  gives the height of the rectangular parallelepiped whose volume approximates the value of the 
double integral ( )∫∫
S
dxdyyxf , . This is particularly useful for finding the volumes of integrals that are hard to 
compute. 
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6. SIMULATIONS  
In order to compare the performance of our approach to the original algorithms in [1], we adopt the same 
simulation method and settings in our experiment. Specifically, we deploy 25 nodes in an area of 750 m × 750 
m. Each node has a communication range of 250 m. All of the nodes move according to a slot-based random 
walk model. Within each slot (of length T seconds), every node will first randomly pick a point in the range of 
(0, 10] m based on the previous position and then move toward it directly. Node 0 is always communicating 
with θ, and the other nodes randomly select a partner within each slot. We use the Dijkstra algorithm for path 
routing. Different paths may share one link and remain unchanged until the next slot. Every node generates 
traffic following a Poisson process at rate R. When the traffic passes by an intermediate node, it will be added 
with i.i.d. uniform delays drawn from [0, Δ] (the traffic order may be permuted due to queuing mechanism). 
After generating all the traffic, each link is padded with independent Poisson chaff noise to rate λ. We 
simulate the network for 1000 slots. In the simulation, λ = 1 packet/second, Δ = 1/18 second, and R = 1/9 
packet/second. 
We have modified the TD and RT algorithms in [1] for our approach. The only difference between ours and 
the original is the selection of the support link. As we discussed in Section 4, assuming that the lack of 
information (pk) on each link is already known, the support link k is selected only if rk / pk ≥ τ. The modified 
algorithms are referred to as TD2 and RT2, accordingly. We simulate TD, TD2, and SIM [1] under various 
thresholds and observation times. In order to find the best threshold τ, we first evaluate TD2 versus different 
τ values. As shown in Fig. 5, for M = 1, we notice that the error probability of TD2 decreases with τ until it 
stabilizes around τ ∈ [0.19, 0.23] and then starts to increase sharply. By this observation, we set τ = 0.2 in the 
subsequent tests to minimize error probability. 
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Fig. 5. Error probability Pe of TD2 vs. threshold τ. 
We then simulate TD2 and SIM [1] for various total observation times MT to evaluate their performance 
affected by the observation time. As we can see from Fig. 6, just like the result of TD in [1], the error 
probability of TD2 also decays subexponentially. When M and T increase, the error probability of TD2 
decreases. Since the SIM is not affected by the observation time, its error probability stays constant over range 
(0.55, 0.75). 
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Fig. 6. Error probability Pe of TD2 and SIM vs. total observation time MT . 
In fact, as long as we have set up a good value for the threshold, the result of TD2 should have the same 
characteristics of that of TD. Hence, the only major difference between TD and TD2 is the selection of 
threshold. Finally, we compare the performance of TD2 to the original TD in [1] under different threshold 
values. In Table 1, we can see that a good threshold for TD (τ ∈ [0.12, 0.14]) will lead to a high error 
probability (nearly 83%) for TD2, while a good threshold for TD2 (τ ∈ [0.19, 0.21]) will lead a high error 
probability (nearly 60%) for TD. We therefore can not tell which one is better based on different thresholds 
which are predefined values. However, TD2 can achieve the lowest error probability when τ = 0.21 and T = 
500, which is about 4 percent lower than TD’s best result.  
Table 1. Comparison on performance between TD and TD2 
T = 50 T = 100 T = 500 τ 
TD TD2 TD TD2 TD TD2 
0.12 0.5617 0.8451 0.5576 0.8539 0.4832 0.8679 
0.13 0.5067 0.8551 0.4041 0.8987 0.4623 0.8422 
0.14 0.6155 0.8348 0.4582 0.8559 0.4751 0.8048 
0.19 0.6344 0.6979 0.5891 0.6899 0.5543 0.5252 
0.20 0.6014 0.6844 0.5892 0.5652 0.5674 0.4325 
0.21 0.6922 0.6511 0.5985 0.5604 0.5810 0.4263 
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Note that the simulation procedure is an abstraction, varying from a simplified simulation to very detail 
emulation. The most detail one is an implementation. The chosen level of abstraction in simulation should be 
just enough to capture the essentials of the studied method. If the simulation is too detail (such as like a 
implementation), it not only costs a lot time, but also obscure the effect of the studied methods due to the 
complexity of the system, which is treated as noise. If the simulation is too simple, it cannot study the method 
well. Therefore, a good approach is to choose an appropriate level of abstraction, neither too simple nor too 
detail, to study the method. We believe that our chosen simulation already has been already good enough to 
evaluate the studied methods. In order to better illustrate the methods, the above deployed scenarios involve 
all the valuable information: random movement of each node, regular communication process, and 
background noise. In such context, we may reasonably draw the conclusion that, our algorithm is an 
alternative way to trace targets in anonymous networks, and that it is better than the algorithm in [1]. 
7. CONCLUSION 
We provided a way to shorten the time interval used for thumbprinting and tune it suitably depending on 
network conditions. We have found interesting properties of the thumbprinting function using the mean value 
and provided a general method to compute the value of the function. The method works for any function that 
satisfies certain properties. We have also studied another mechanism for tracing intruders in the Internet by 
passively monitoring flows between source and destination pairs. We computed the error probability of our 
algorithm and showed that its value decreases exponentially as the observation time increases. Our simulation 
shows that our algorithm is an alternative way to trace targets in anonymous networks, and that it is better 
than the algorithm in [1]. 
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